

7 SEPT 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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
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7 SEPTEMBER 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 AUGUST - 3 SEPTEMBER 1972**Moscow (2781 items)**

Vietnam	(7%)	17%
[DRV National Day	(0.1%)	8%]
[Solidarity Month,	(2%)	4%]
International		
Protest Day		
China	(4%)	9%
[PRC Opposition to	(1%)	6%]
Bangladesh UN Seat		
Angela Davis in USSK	(--)	3%
Middle East	(3%)	3%
European Security	(1%)	2%

Peking (1339 items)

Domestic Issues	(38%)	32%
Vietnam	(5%)	15%
[DRV National Day	(--)	13%]
Asian Table Tennis	(--)	14%
Tournament, Congress		
Bangladesh UN Seat	(4%)	0%
PRC Vice Foreign	(--)	5%
Minister in Pakistan		
PRC Vessel Attacked off	(4%)	3%
DRV Coast		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi marked North Vietnamese National Day in standard fashion this year with a public meeting addressed by Pham Van Dong and attended by other DRV leaders. Dong's speech reasserted Hanoi's policies on major issues and maintained that "the significance, impact, and proud results" of the DRV's struggle "confirm the correctness and clear-sightedness of our party's political, military, and diplomatic line." Reports of a 3 September memorial service on the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death indicate that two alternate members of the Political Bureau have been elevated to full membership--a development coinciding with signs that there has been a leadership review and reaffirmation of DRV policies.

The recent flurry of Hanoi propaganda attacking the President's stand on Vietnam and ridiculing U.S. expressions of optimism regarding a settlement was climaxed by a 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article which discussed the respective negotiating positions in more detail than has appeared in DRV media since last winter. Commentator as well as Pham Van Dong in his National Day address rejected the U.S. position and forcefully pressed for "simultaneous" solution of the military and political aspects of the Vietnam issue on the basis of the PRG proposals.

Peking used the occasion of the DRV anniversary to offer reassurances to Hanoi of its continuing military and political support, even hinting that the United States has miscalculated in hoping that big-power pressure could induce the DRV to compromise. Again marking the anniversary with a leaders' message signed by Mao and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the Chinese reaffirmed both their pledge to assist the war effort and their endorsement of the PRG's peace proposal. At the same time, the Chinese have sustained their cautious treatment of the Nixon Administration and have avoided commenting on the presidential election.

Moscow marked the DRV's National Day with the standard leaders' message and meeting in the Soviet capital, and as usual the DRV ambassador gave a reception and spoke over Moscow TV. Soviet comment stressed the constancy of aid from the USSR, but differences in DRV and Soviet coverage of speeches at the Moscow meeting suggested some strains. Routine Moscow comment on the anniversary also contrasted steadfast Soviet support with Peking's "splittist" policies.

DRV LEADERS MARK ANNIVERSARIES; NEW POLITBURO MEMBERS LISTED

The annual public meeting in Hanoi to mark the anniversary of the DRV's National Day (2 September) as usual heard brief opening

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remarks by Truong Chinh as well as the main address by Pham Van Dong. The meeting was also attended by President Ton Duc Thang and other party leaders, including Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Nguyen Van Tran. These same leaders, with the exception of Ton Duc Thang, also took part in the traditional wreath-laying ceremony at the Hanoi military cemetery. Political Bureau members Le Duc Tho and Hoang Van Hoan appeared only at a 3 September memorial service for Ho Chi Minh which prompted the appearance of the entire body, with the usual exception of Pham Hung.*

Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong also received foreign officials at the presidential palace on the occasion of national day. VNA noted that Ton Duc Thang spoke at the reception, which was attended by diplomatic envoys, the acting director of the Lao Patriotic Front information bureau, members of the ICC, and foreign visitors. Pham Van Dong has given the national day reception for foreign guests in previous years, and the occasion has prompted larger turnouts of high-level DRV officials, including Le Duan, Giap, and Foreign Minister Trinh. There was no reception of any kind in 1971 or in 1969, in the latter case perhaps because of Ho's failing health.

Reports on the 3 September Ho Chi Minh memorial service for the first time identified Tran Quoc Hoan and Gen. Van Tien Dung as Political Bureau members rather than as alternate members. There is no indication of when they were elevated. The VWP statutes do not spell out the procedures to be followed in filling Politburo vacancies, although the statutes do note that the members and alternate members are elected at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee. The last announced plenum was the 20th--first mentioned by speakers at the 20-25 March National Assembly session this year which said it had been held "early this year." Apparently no action to elevate Hoan and Dung was taken at that time, since both men were identified as alternates after the 20th plenum had presumably been held: Van Tien Dung was still identified as an alternate member in an article in the 24 March NHAN DAN, and Tran Quoc Hoan was similarly identified in a footnote to an article he wrote for the March HOC TAP.

The party statutes suggest that alternate members of executive committees are automatically moved up to full committee membership

* Hanoi last reported a public appearance by Pham Hung in September 1967.

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when vacancies occur.* But apparently this practice does not apply to the Politburo, since Hoan and Dung were not elevated following the deaths of Nguyen Chi Thanh in July 1967 and Ho Chi Minh in September 1969.

It is possible that Hoan and Dung were elevated at a Politburo meeting some time since the 20th plenum. There have been elements in the propaganda suggesting the possibility that a policy review took place at such a meeting. Hanoi has called attention in recent weeks to an unpublicized resolution of the Politburo. The resolution was cited--without further description--as a document for study in the 24 August NHAN DAN editorial,** and a 20 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Vice Minister of Public Security Tran Quyet noted that "our party Central Committee Political Bureau has issued the resolution on 'changing the directions of and stepping up all the tasks of the North in order to defeat the U.S. aggressors.'"

NHAN DAN'S COMMENTATOR, PHAM VAN DONG PRESS PRG PROPOSALS

The 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article, entitled "Two Key Problems," showed apparent concern to restate the DRV position on a political settlement in the wake of the President's reaffirmations of the U.S. stand, expressions of optimism by Administration spokesmen, and speculation about the last private meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on 14 August. While it was more detailed than any Hanoi propaganda on negotiations in months, the article broke no new ground. It spelled out the PRG's February elaboration on U.S. withdrawal and a political settlement in South Vietnam, and it assailed the President's eight points and his proposal for a cease-fire before an overall agreement. Thus, the fact of the article's appearance at this time seems more notable than its substance.

While the article was typically critical of U.S. proposals, its tone was sober and it did not contain the usual vitriolic bombast about the President. In the absence of information

* Article 16 of the party statutes, published in the 15 September 1960 NHAN DAN, states: "When there are vacancies in executive committees of various levels, alternate members will fill the vacancies successively and according to the number of votes they obtained at delegates' congresses or party members' congresses."

** The 24 August NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 30 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 6-7.

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regarding possible diplomatic developments, it is difficult to assess the timing and tone of the article. However, it appears to reflect concern to present the Vietnamese communists' stand as both reasonable and firm and to underscore their desire for a negotiated settlement. It might be conjectured in this connection that the article was aimed in part at justifying the DRV's position to its allies. Aside from the communist statements at Paris, there had been no comprehensive, authoritative comment on negotiations since the President's 8 May proposals and the resumption of the Paris talks on 13 July; Hanoi may thus have wanted to reaffirm its position on the eve of DRV National Day, particularly since Pham Van Dong also dealt with the PRG proposal in some detail.

COMMENTATOR ON U.S. PROPOSALS That the NHAN DAN Commentator article was in part prompted by U.S. statements is clearly indicated in the first section, headed "Tricks That Can Deceive No One," which assailed U.S. "clamoring" that the war is winding down and that there is great progress toward peace. It singled out the Republican Party platform as well as the President's 23 August speech at the convention and his press conference in San Clemente on the 29th. Reiterating opposition to both the U.S. eight-point proposal released in January and the 8 May proposal, Commentator went on to detail the latter, noting that it included a call for a cease-fire, complete U.S. withdrawal within four months, and release of U.S. prisoners. Commentator observed that this proposal, coupled with U.S. escalation, "constitutes an ultimatum to cow the chicken-hearted."

In a section titled "The Scheme to Separate the Military from the Political," the article continued--along the lines of the Vietnamese communist delegates' statements at the Paris talks--to insist that the two aspects must be settled simultaneously. Commentator not only scored the President's 8 May proposal but observed critically that in his eight points the President demands a general election with NFLSV participation six months after a cease-fire to choose a president for South Vietnam.

Commentator rebutted President Nixon's arguments that "he is succeeding, through his reescalation since April, in making the Vietnamese accept his terms." Claiming that the communists have in fact not been deterred in their struggle and that the North has been able to continue to supply the frontline, he said:

By releasing the unbelievable story that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have

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become exhausted and the North Vietnamese have lost their morale, the Nixon Administration has deceived public opinion and itself.

BACKGROUND: A 9 May LPA report on the President's 8 May speech had acknowledged all three aspects of the President's proposal. Hanoi initially ignored it, however, and the DRV Government statement of 10 May and other Hanoi propaganda focused on the President's announcement that the United States would mine DRV ports. His call for a cease-fire was first mentioned by Hanoi in a 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claiming that the United States was "plotting to organize an Asian peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations to achieve a cease-fire throughout Indochina as suggested by President Nixon's 8 May address." A 3 July NHAN DAN Commentator article on the President's 29 June press conference--in which he announced the Paris talks would resume on 13 July after a two-month suspension--observed that he continued the "ultimatum-type arguments of his 8 May speech" that he would end the blockade and bombing only when the Vietnamese released U.S. POW's and approved a cease-fire throughout Indochina. Although the communist delegates at Paris have referred to all three aspects of the proposal, including withdrawal of U.S. troops in four months, the proposal in its entirety has been spelled out only infrequently in Hanoi media.

COMMENTATOR ON PRG PROPOSAL Under the heading "The Seven-Point Solution," Commentator repeated almost verbatim the PRG's two-point elaboration of the seven points introduced last February,* following the President's 25 January disclosure of the private U.S.-DRV negotiations and his release of the U.S. eight-point proposal, which he revealed had been presented to the DRV last fall. Thus, on the "military side," Commentator said the United States must stop air and naval action against both zones of Vietnam; must withdraw all U.S. and allied forces, military advisers and personnel, weapons, and war materials and dismantle all bases; and must fix a terminal date which would also be the date for the release of all prisoners of war.

On the political aspect, Commentator generally echoed the demands of the February elaboration, but with some differences in language. Thus, he began by saying the United States "must

* Propaganda in recent months has repeatedly pressed the two points in general terms but has not spelled them out in detail. The only other NHAN DAN Commentator article to do so was one of 19 February, shortly after the "elaboration" was introduced.

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terminate its support for the Saigon puppet administration" so that the South Vietnamese may exercise their right of self-determination; the February elaboration said that the United States must put an end to all interference in the South's internal affairs. Commentator said that "the stand of the Vietnamese is that Thieu must resign and the Saigon administration must give up its war-seeking policy and dissolve the repressive apparatus"; the February elaboration said Thieu must resign "immediately" and gave some details on the disbanding of the "repressive" machinery, such as the ending of the pacification policy and freeing of political prisoners. Commentator echoed the February elaboration in saying the PRG would then discuss with the Saigon administration the formation of a three-segment government of national concord to conduct a genuinely free and democratic election, but he did not go on to specify that the election would be for a constituent assembly to work out a constitution and set up a government.

Commentator stressed that these military and political aspects of the Vietnam issue are inseparable "and must be settled simultaneously." He went on to say that "after the U.S. has agreed to a solution," a cease-fire will be put into effect and the release of U.S. prisoners will be carried out at the same time as the complete withdrawal of U.S. armed forces. (The PRG's original seven points as introduced in July 1971, under point one on U.S. withdrawal, said that as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal of all allied forces "a cease-fire will be observed between the PLAF and the U.S. forces." Similarly, point two on a political settlement in South Vietnam said that a cease-fire between the PLAF and the Saigon forces would be observed as soon as a government of national concord was formed.)

PHAM VAN DONG SPEECH

In his National Day speech Pham Van Dong forcefully reaffirmed Vietnamese determination to persist in the struggle if the United States insists on pursuing its Vietnamization policy and refuses to negotiate on the basis of the PRG proposals. He said: "In order to put a definite end to Vietnamization of the war and restore peace . . . there must be an all-inclusive solution as proposed in the PRG's seven-point solution, the two key points of which have been clarified." He then proceeded to detail the demands on U.S. withdrawal in the PRG proposal and added that the United States must give up "all military commitments to the Saigon puppet administration." Without repeating the details of the PRG elaboration on a political settlement in South Vietnam, he said that

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"the United States must give up its support of the Saigon puppet administration and agree to the establishment of a three-segment coalition government, which the U.S. ruling circles have so far obstinately rejected." He went on to argue "the absolute necessity" of having a government in the South comprising all forces and political tendencies, and he again denied U.S. "slanders" that there is an intention to impose a communist regime on the South.

Unlike the Commentator article, Dong did not acknowledge the substance of the U.S. proposals, saying only that "the so-called eight-point stand and the President's 8 May statement are aimed simply at maintaining the puppet administration and eliminating the PRG." He added that U.S. intent to continue Vietnamization of the war and to continue the "war of aggression" was again demonstrated by the President's speech at the Republican convention.

In a passage that seems aimed at the DRV's big communist allies, Dong said:

More than anybody else, we cherish peace
At the same time, we are always well aware that a genuine and stable peace actually can be obtained only through the fight for independence and freedom, and can only be the result of victory over the war of aggression by U.S. imperialism. All illusions and all compromises on this crucial question will be very dangerous, as has been proved by so many examples in various parts of the world. That is our staunch and consistent attitude.

Dong's remarks on aid from the communist allies also contained polemical overtones. He voiced gratitude for socialist sympathy, "heartfelt and disinterested support," and "great and efficacious assistance," thus repeating the traditional expression of thanks to the socialist countries which had been absent from his speech last year in the wake of the bitter Sino-Vietnam polemic in July and August 1971. Last year Dong had taken note of socialist assistance in a pointed passage which held, in effect, that the backing of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries was warranted because of the correctness of DRV policies. This year he again suggested,

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in even stronger terms, that socialist assistance was the DRV's right. Noting that the Vietnamese struggle is part of the world struggle against "imperialism" and that it has made "worthy contributions acknowledged by all," he added:

So we are all the more entitled to ask the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and the other countries in the world to hold higher the banner of proletarian internationalism and fulfill their international duty to the glorious fight that is raging very fiercely in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina

Pham Van Dong's reference to the "international duty" of socialist countries in this argumentative context is particularly noteworthy in the wake of the 17 August NHAN DAN editorial's warning that a country which is concerned only with its own narrow, immediate interests will not only "harm the revolutionary movements of various countries, but in the end will bring itself incalculable losses and give up its lofty internationalist duty."

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DRV LAUDS SOUTHERN OFFENSIVE, CITES ALLEGED AUGUST SUCCESSES

Hanoi propaganda on the occasion of DRV National Day predictably lauds the offensive launched in South Vietnam at the end of March. Pham Van Dong, in his anniversary speech, reiterated the standard claim that the offensive represents a "new step" in the war, leading to significant changes in the balance of forces and opening up "new opportunities and highly promising prospects." Dong echoed the views of the VWP Central Committee's 20th plenum, held this year before the start of the offensive, when he maintained that "we are in an ascending position" while the allies are "racing downhill to the abyss of defeat."*

The offensive was also lauded in editorials marking the national holiday, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, declaring that "victories" in the past five months "constitute a brilliant success for the correct, clear-sighted revolutionary line and the talented war leadership of our party--the great staff of the Vietnamese revolution." The army paper acknowledged that "Nixon can make the war become fiercer," but it maintained that "he can in no way reverse the situation" and added that the communists' military and political situation is very favorable, with unprecedented prestige, "revolutionary impetus," and strength. NHAN DAN's editorial on the anniversary went beyond a conventional appraisal of the military situation to suggest that the war is at a crucial point which could be followed by either great progress or new problems. After noting that "now is the time" for the United States to decide whether it will pursue a path of "protracted war," the editorial claimed that "the revolution has many capabilities to develop" and asserted that "revolutionaries must know how to create and how to firmly grasp opportunities and make use of all favorable possibilities, but at the same time they must always stand ready to handle the most complex and difficult eventualities." This passage suggests concerns similar to those reflected in the 19 August NHAN DAN editorial on the August Revolution anniversary which discussed at length the pattern of "rise and ebb of the revolution," noting that the revolution is characterized by "difficulties and facilities, gradual development and leaping progress, continuous process and turning points at each stage."**

* The VWP's 20th Plenum is discussed in the 12 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

** The 19 August editorial is discussed in the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 4-5.

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Some of the most sweeping praise of military developments in South Vietnam was contained in a series of articles--only partially available in translation at this time--which were broadcast by Hanoi and began appearing in NHAN DAN on 4 September. NHAN DAN noted that the articles are to be used as "documents" in the "current political activity drive," thus suggesting that Hanoi decided that a fuller explanation of the war situation was needed for the drive to study party policies which was announced in the 24 August NHAN DAN editorial. The 4 September article declared that the struggle in the South had achieved "unprecedentedly great victories" in the past five months and held that it is important that these "victories" be widely propagandized as part of the "propaganda and educational tasks aimed at stimulating confidence, strengthening determination, and encouraging the revolutionary activities of various collectives and individuals. . . ."

AUGUST FIGHTING The communists' monthly release of statistics on their alleged achievements in the offensive in South Vietnam prompted editorials in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 1 September. The army paper commented that the fighting in August had created a more favorable strategic position, with "many vast, mutually supporting base areas, dangerous offensive springboards, and new conditions for overcoming the difficulties caused by the enemy."

The communists claimed that during the month of August their forces wiped out or captured 30,000 allies, downed or destroyed on the ground 200 aircraft, and captured or wrecked 100 cannon and 400 military vehicles, including "many" tanks and armored cars. The claims are significantly lower than those for the month of July when the communists indicated they had put out of action 70,000 troops. However, the communist claims of allied casualties in May and June were comparable with August, with 60,000 troops said to have been put out of action during that two-month period; 90,000 allies were allegedly wiped out in April.* The 4 September NHAN DAN article on the fighting in the South totaled alleged allied losses since the start of the offensive, claiming that 250,000 troops had been wiped out and that 1,300 pieces of artillery, 1,300 aircraft, and 5,800 military vehicles, including 2,000 tanks and armored cars, had been destroyed or captured.

* Communist statistics on their alleged successes in the offensive during July are discussed in the 2 August TRENDS, pages 11-12. The communist figures for earlier periods were covered in the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, page 11, and 10 May 1972, page 20.

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PEKING SEEKS TO REASSURE VIETNAMESE OF CONTINUING SUPPORT

Consistent with its carefully balanced treatment of the Vietnam question in recent months, Peking used the occasion of the DRV's 27th anniversary to reassure the North Vietnamese of Chinese support on both the military and negotiating fronts while pulling its punches in dealing with the Nixon Administration. Peking renewed its endorsement of the PRG's seven-point peace plan in terms that made clear its desire for a settlement while sidestepping crucial questions concerning the future of the Saigon regime. At the same time, Peking hinted at concern over the acute apprehension recently expressed by Hanoi regarding the impact of big-power relations on the Vietnam question.

Following the pattern initiated two years ago, Peking marked the 2 September anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial along with the traditional leaders' message and a speech by a high-ranking leader at the DRV embassy's annual reception. The leaders' message was signed by Mao, PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu, NPC Chairman Chu Te, and Premier Chou En-lai.* The embassy reception was honored by a strong turnout headed by Chou, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, and the three Politburo alternate members. As has been the practice since the purge of the top military leaders, Yeh replaced Huang Yung-sheng as the speaker at this year's reception.

CHINESE SUPPORT The leaders' message reaffirmed the "bounden internationalist duty" to "support and assist" the Vietnamese in their war effort. Like the message, the 1 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pledged Chinese support to the Vietnamese "close comrades-in-arms and brothers," adding that the unity of the two parties and peoples is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Unlike the message, the editorial also used the occasion to endorse the seven-point plan, calling on the United States to "conduct serious negotiations . . . on the basis of the seven-point proposal" and stressing that "there is no other way out."**

* This format represents a return to the orthodox pattern used before the cultural revolution, replacing the anomalous Mao-Lin-Chou trinity. The four signators are the heads of party, state, parliament, and government. The Chinese message on the 22 August Romanian National Day did not include Chu, presumably because Romania--unlike the DRV--does not include the head of parliament in its protocol of top leaders.

** Peking's last authoritative reference to the seven points was contained in a 4 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seconding formal statements by its allies.

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The editorial added that it is "entirely miscalculation" on Washington's part to attempt to coerce the Vietnamese with war escalation "or any other methods of intimidation."

The unusual reference to "other methods of intimidation" could be a hint of concern over Hanoi's sharply expressed displeasure with its big allies for proffering counsels of compromise out of their own big-power considerations. Peking had previously identified the suspension of the Paris talks as a method of U.S. pressure on Hanoi besides military measures, as in a 31 March PRC Foreign Ministry statement accusing the United States of using a suspension of the talks "as a threat to force the Vietnamese people to accept" the U.S. peace terms. In the current context the editorial's condemnation of nonmilitary methods of pressuring Hanoi may be read as a reassurance to the North Vietnamese and a reminder to the United States that the Chinese will not exert undue leverage on their allies in the interests of an accommodation in Indochina.

In his speech Yeh said the Chinese "resolutely support" the seven-point proposal and will continue to "support and assist" the Vietnamese war effort as a "firm and unshakable" commitment. Yeh went to some length to document a continuing broad scope of U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia despite the withdrawal of ground troops, concluding that these measures have "exploded the U.S. Government's lie" about a desire for a quick end to the war. But while endorsing the communist peace plan and criticizing the United States for using military and other pressure on Hanoi, neither Yeh's speech nor the editorial mentioned the Thieu government or U.S. relations with Saigon. The DRV ambassador, on the other hand, complained that Washington is sticking by the Thieu government and demanded that the United States cease its support. The ambassador also singled out the Chinese supplementary aid agreements, a subject which Yeh avoided.

TREATMENT OF U.S. In contrast to the DRV Ambassador's denunciation of "the very bellicose, stubborn, and perfidious Nixon Administration," the Chinese did not assail the Nixon Administration by name and avoided last year's criticism of the Nixon Doctrine. Also absent was last year's characterization of the Vietnamese situation as being "unprecedentedly fine," a formulation appearing after the Lam Son 719 operation and serving to justify Peking's moves toward a thaw in Sino-U.S. relations. This year the Chinese said the situation is "excellent" as a result of "successive fierce offensives"--a more cautious characterization reflecting Peking's restraint in assessing the communist offensive this year.

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Peking's cautious approach has also been reflected in its treatment of the President's recent statements. In contrast to Hanoi's approach, Peking has scrupulously avoided commenting on the presidential campaign. A straightforward NCNA account on 24 August of the Democratic and Republican conventions offered no comment other than to note that the two parties are "bourgeois" and that there were antiwar demonstrations on both occasions. NCNA also carried summaries of Vietnamese communist comment on the President's remarks on Vietnam in his acceptance speech. An NCNA account of the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article on a peace settlement carefully deleted those passages discussing the Vietnam question in the context of the U.S. elections.

MOSCOW OBSERVES DRV NATIONAL DAY WITH EMPHASIS ON AID

Soviet aid was played up in the usual greetings from the three top Soviet leaders to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong on DRV National Day. Moscow marked the occasion in customary fashion with a meeting in the Soviet capital, and the DRV ambassador gave the usual reception and spoke over Moscow TV.

The Soviet message echoed the language of Brezhnev's 27 June speech when it condemned the U.S. "blockading" of DRV ports and bombing of populated areas, economic establishments, water conservancy projects, and lines of communication. A passage which immediately followed expressed confidence that "no perfidious political or diplomatic trick" can subdue the Vietnamese, but this apparent allusion to U.S. diplomacy did not name the perpetrator of the trickery. A similar passage in last year's message had condemned "whatever maneuvering and contrivances the imperialist aggressors might resort to."

The Soviet message once again pledged "all-round support and assistance" to the DRV to strengthen its defenses and "satisfy the requirements" of its economy. Last year's message had additionally pledged assistance to "the patriotic forces of Laos and Cambodia." Absent from this year's message was an assertion of the Soviet Government's resolve to strengthen relations with the VWP, a passage that appeared last year in connection with a reference to Podgornyy's forthcoming visit to the DRV. After calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from Vietnam and for a "correct political solution" without foreign interference, this year's message termed the DRV and PRG proposals "a realistic basis for constructive negotiations." The corresponding passage in last year's message, unlike this year's, had referred explicitly to the PRG's seven points.

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The Moscow meeting, held on 30 August, was attended by Politburo member Mazurov and party Secretary Katushev and was addressed by a Supreme Soviet official. Mazurov and Katushev attended the meetings in the last two previous years; in earlier nondecennial years the meetings had been attended variously by Politburo members and candidate members. Vice Premier Novikov was the speaker last year, but the 1970 speaker was a Supreme Soviet official and the meetings were addressed by a Moscow city official in earlier nondecennial years.

According to a brief TASS report, the Soviet speaker viewed the Vietnamese people's achievements as proof that they had chosen "the correct path" under VWP leadership and asserted that the USSR "consistently gives all-round moral and political support" to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples. The Soviet people, he pledged, will "remain reliable friends" of the Indochinese. A longer report broadcast by Moscow in Vietnamese quoted the Soviet speaker as elaborating on the nature of Soviet aid, much as he did last year, pointing up economic aid, the training of DRV specialists, and the supply of "modern weapons." Hanoi predictably did not report the elaboration of the aid. Its coverage of the Moscow meeting instead highlighted remarks--for the most part unreported in Moscow's accounts--in which the Soviet speaker denounced the United States for failure to respond to the DRV and PRG proposals, for continuing to support Thieu, and for pursuing "aggression," praised the "patriotic forces" victories since April, and decried U.S. bombing of the North.

According to TASS, the DRV ambassador told the meeting that the Vietnamese always remember that "we owe our success in building socialism and in fighting the aggression" to the "consistent and effective aid" of the USSR and the support of "all progressive mankind." Moscow radio's longer version in Vietnamese quoted him as saying that the greater the North Vietnamese victories in the anti-U.S. struggle and for socialist development, "the more we appreciate the great merits of the October Revolution and the great Lenin." While this passage is much like one in the ambassador's speech last year, it notably appears now in the wake of Hanoi's polemical complaints that the DRV's big communist allies are engaging in a policy of "reconciliation" and "compromise" and are departing from the true revolutionary path. The radio also quoted the ambassador as recalling Ho's teaching that "one must remember the source of the water one drinks"--a "teaching" PRAVDA had cited in a 28 August editorial, in a passage which seemed responsive to Hanoi's polemics, lecturing the Vietnamese

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on their debt to Lenin and the October Revolution.* Hanoi's reports of the ambassador's speech did not include any of these remarks, although they did acknowledge that he thanked the Soviet Union for its "great and effective support and assistance."

Moscow's brief reports of Pham Van Dong's anniversary speech noted that he conveyed greetings to "the peoples of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries," neglecting to mention that he also cited the PRC. Routine Moscow comment on the anniversary took the occasion again to contrast Moscow's "ample and comprehensive" support with Peking's "splittist" policies. A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 31 August, stressing Soviet military and economic aid to the DRV, repeated the line that the DRV's achievements would undoubtedly have been greater had the Chinese leaders cooperated in the assistance by socialist countries. The Chinese, it said, actually "interrupt and refuse to cooperate" in the aid. (Western agencies on 4 September reported Sihanouk as claiming in an interview in Peking that the USSR and China have reached a new agreement on the transport of arms and material to the DRV since the "blockade" and that the number of trains has been increased, with even missiles being transported by rail.)

PROPAGANDA ON RELEASE OF PILOTS STRESSES DRV HUMANENESS

Announcing the DRV's first decision to release U.S. prisoners of war since the summer of 1969, Hanoi radio on 2 September broadcast the text of an order issued that day by the General Political Department of the VPA for the release of three American fliers. Hanoi has released U.S. pilots on three previous occasions--in February and August 1968 and August 1969--freeing three men each

* The PRAVDA editorial is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 August 1972, pages 20-21. Another possible Soviet response to the DRV's complaints may have been reflected in a 31 August TASS report that a DRV representative had attended as an "observer" a 29-31 August Warsaw conference of "senior officials" of foreign ministries of socialist countries to discuss the forthcoming UN General Assembly. Thus placing a DRV representative in the company of the USSR, its East European allies, Cuba, and Mongolia, TASS reported that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of "comradely cooperation and full mutual understanding." Past reports of this annual meeting have never mentioned the presence of a DRV observer.

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time. In each case, a slight delay occurred between the announcement and the actual release; the first release decision was announced in late January 1968 and the other two on 3 July 1968 and 3 July 1969, timed for U.S. independence day.

Captured in 1968, 1971, and 1972, respectively, the pilots now to be released--Navy lieutenants (jg) Markham Ligor Gartley and Norris Alphonzo Charles and Air Force Major Edward Knight Elias--are being freed, according to the VPA order, "on the occasion of" DRV National Day. Reported by Hanoi radio and more briefly by VNA, the order said the decision had been taken "proceeding from the humane and lenient policy of the DRV Government and considering the applications for amnesty of American pilots captured in North Vietnam."

The theme of leniency was taken up, together with an explanation of the length of time elapsed since the last prisoner release, in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 2 September. The statement opened with the assertion that captured American pilots, despite being "guilty of crimes against the Vietnamese people and of violation of international law," have received humane treatment from the DRV Government. Pointing to the release of U.S. pilots in 1968 as evidence of the DRV's humanitarian approach, the statement argued that all the captured pilots could have returned home much sooner had the U.S. Government given a "positive response" to the PRG's seven points. The periodic release of prisoners begun in 1968 had been "temporarily suspended," it said, because the U.S. Government had compelled the pilots released in August 1969 "to put forward distortions about the humane policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," at "complete variance" with their statements upon release, and had used them "in war activities against the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Indochina." Following a summary of the points contained in the VPA order, the foreign ministry spokesman's statement enjoined the U.S. Government to "stop using the released pilots to slander the DRV and further the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam." The statement announced that to help achieve this objective, the three released pilots would be handed over to "a U.S. social organization animated with goodwill and a desire to bring about an early end to the U.S. war in Vietnam."

Hanoi expanded on the points made in the two official statements in a radio commentary on 2 September and in a NHAN DAN commentary on the 4th. The radio commentary, entitled "A Policy Shining With Humanity," focused on the foreign ministry spokesman's warning to the U.S. Government against using the released pilots for propaganda purposes,

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"for the sake of the families of the U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam." As an example of the behavior expected of released prisoners, it cited statements attributed to two of the pilots returned in February and August 1968 to the effect that they had been treated "very kindly" in the North. Contrasting this treatment--allegedly verified by such visitors as Ramsey Clark and Jane Fonda--with the "Nixon clique's" distortion of it, the commentary claimed that the Administration is further blocking a settlement of the POW problem by refusing to accept Article I of the PRG's seven-point peace plan, continuing the Vietnamization policy, "re-Americanizing" the war, and renewing the air war against the DRV. Charging the President with trying to deceive the American people in order to help his campaign for re-election, the commentary declared that the DRV's "humane gesture" will certainly win "more sympathy and support" in the United States as well as worldwide and warned that the President must be held "totally responsible" for the fate of U.S. servicemen held captive in Vietnam.

The NHAN DAN commentary, entitled "Leniency and Humanity," contrasted DRV policies and motives with the President's alleged use of released pilots as "a catalyst to create a chauvinist wave among the American people in an attempt to direct the American people's indignation over the consequences of the war at the victims of the U.S. war of destruction, the Vietnamese people." NHAN DAN went on to claim that the President's "odious contention"--at the Republican convention and at his 29 August press conference--that the United States will maintain a presence in South Vietnam until all POW's are released "is only the insolent, ridiculous contention of a robber, a kind of demagogy aimed at playing on the sentiments of the American people and dragging out the war of aggression in Vietnam." President Nixon's "true colors," it said, had been demonstrated by continued bombing of the DRV after the release had been announced.

In keeping with previous practice, Hanoi at this writing has not directly spelled out any details of the release procedure. On 4 September, however, Hanoi's English service did carry, without comment, an AFP report that the three servicemen would be turned over to the cochairmen of the U.S. Committee of Liaison for Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam, Cora Weiss and David Dellinger, "on a date not yet stated." The AFP report speculated that the cochairmen would accompany the released pilots to their homes to prevent "their being kidnaped by U.S. authorities" as happened "when [the authorities] intercepted the first three prisoners released in February 1968."

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PEKING, MOSCOW REPORTS Peking's NCNA carried prompt reports of both the VPA order and the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. Soviet media also reported the DRV statements, and a Radio Moscow commentary in foreign languages brought up the prisoner-release decision in the context of North Vietnamese efforts for peace. The decision has been viewed throughout the world, the commentary said, as an expression of the DRV's "good will and of genuine hope for solution of the conflict by peaceful means." It added that the DRV statement that the pilots could have gone home earlier had Washington responded positively to the communists' seven-point proposal had "also met with complete understanding and approval."

DRV CONTINUES LOW-KEY RESPONSE TO U.S. AIR STRIKES IN NORTH

Relatively heavy U.S. air raids on the North during the past week drew little comment from Hanoi, other than in routine foreign ministry spokesman's statements. Two short VNA items did highlight action during the week, however. A VNA report on 31 August claimed that U.S. aircraft for the second time had carried out "extermination bombing" of the Thanh Hoa provincial capital, destroying a hotel, a high school, and some houses, and killing or injuring "many civilians." And a longer report on 5 September cited four B-52 attacks on the 3d on Quang Ninh district and Dong Hoi town in Quang Binh Province, which resulted in "hundreds of civilian casualties," and the dropping on 4 September of "over 100 bombs and many rockets" on villages in Vinh Phu Province, which reportedly killed 14 persons and destroyed many houses. The report said that the raid on Vinh Phu followed several others on the two preceding days, "during which many inhabitants had been killed or wounded."

The issue of strikes against dikes was not stressed during the week, with only the spokesman's statement of 31 August claiming an actual hit. In keeping with recent emphasis on dike maintenance and repair, VNA on 5 September carried a report of a Council of Ministers order on perfecting hydraulics systems throughout North Vietnam. Without mentioning U.S. bombing, the order stressed that restoration of old hydraulics works is as important as the building of new ones. It announced the creation of a "central-level supervision committee" to aid the Council of Ministers in directing this work, projected to take place over the next three to four years, so that "irrigation may be regulated at will to ensure intensive cultivation, soil transformation, and higher labor

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efficiency." Similarly, on 7 September Hanoi radio revealed that the Premier's Office recently met with leading members of the Central Agriculture Commission and the Water Conservancy Ministry to discuss measures to perfect the vast network of hydraulic projects as a means to improve agricultural production. The radio report again did not mention U.S. strikes at water conservancy projects, but called upon all provincial agricultural and water conservancy branches "to create new capabilities in production organizations to insure technical requirements, intensive cultivation, and more yearly crops."

Other comment on the dikes was contained mainly in delayed reportage on activities connected with "dike day" (28 August), including expressions of support from socialist countries and "people's delegations." LPA on 31 August carried an article on the dikes, by Vietnam Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao, published in the NFLSV weekly SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE. Essentially a restatement of the standard claims made by the DRV during the summer, Thao's article carefully documented the specific articles of the Hague convention and Nuremberg Tribunal which the United States has allegedly violated. Charging that the President, "as an astute lawyer," has attempted to avoid his responsibility for ordering strikes at dikes by declaring that dike sections with SAM sites can be considered military targets, Thao claimed that the President is using "pressure methods of a more radical, exterminating nature" in order to impose "American neo-colonialism" on South Vietnam. Thao also denied the contention that the surface of the dikes is used as a road.

In further attention to the bombing issue in general, VNA on 5 September cited a Stockholm report on a communique condemning U.S. "war crimes" and calling for world support for Vietnam, issued by the Executive Committee of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam. And on 7 September VNA carried Ramsey Clark's article on his visit to the DRV, which, it said, was published in LIFE magazine on 25 August. Otherwise, Hanoi focused its attention mainly on efforts to improve the militia and self-defense forces and on strengthening "passive air defense measures," such as the building of shelters and the dispersal of the population. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 31 August discussed the latter topic, while the former was taken up in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 5 September.

Detailed attention to one aspect of air defense was provided in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of 17 August, now available in translation, which discussed the "characteristics, tricks, strong points, and

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weaknesses" of the AH-1G helicopter. The article claimed that this helicopter had recently been sent on "reconnaissance and strafing missions" along the northern coast, especially between the Vinh Linh zone and Thanh Hoa Province. After detailing the helicopter's method of attack, the article provided instructions on shooting it down with infantry weapons. The 1 September NHAN DAN editorial on the "August armed exploits" included the claim that the regional firenet had downed U.S. helicopters which had "sneaked into our coastal areas."

**SPOKESMAN'S
STATEMENTS**

U.S. strikes at targets within North Vietnam during the past week triggered the following routine statements by the spokesman of the DRV Foreign

Ministry:

+ The alleged bombing of Vinh city and strikes at a section of dike in Nghi Xuan district of Ha Tinh Province, both on 30 August, were highlighted in the statement of the 31st, which condemned the bombing of populous areas and "systematic attacks on the DRV's dikes and dams." The statement also protested air strikes on populated areas in Ha Bac, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, and charged that U.S. warships "fiercely attacked" the Sam Son resort in Thanh Hoa Province as well as coastal villages in Ha Tinh.

+ The statment of 1 September protested air strikes on the suburbs of Haiphong and the towns of Thanh Hoa, Kien An, Hon Gai, Dong Hoi, Cam Pha, and Ky Anh, as well as populous areas in the provinces of Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone. It claimed that B-52's "wantonly" attacked areas in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone, and that U.S. warships shelled coastal hamlets in Ha Tinh and Vinh Linh. Targets reported hit included several schools and the cathedral in Thanh Hoa city. Using stronger language than usual to condemn these "rabid war acts," the statement charged that they constitute "a crude encroachment" on the DRV's sovereignty and security, and that they are "an impudent provocation" to world and U.S. public opinion.

+ Calling U.S. bombing of the North "a blatant violation" of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and the U.S. Government's commitment to halt "unconditionally" all such bombing, the statement of 2 September condemned alleged bombing on the 1st of populated areas on Cat Ba Island off Haiphong and in the provinces of Lang Son, Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa,

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Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh, as well as in the Vinh Linh zone. It also charged that U.S. warships shelled coastal villages in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An.

+ Alleged air strikes on 2 September were protested in the statement of the 3d, which claimed that "these criminal acts of war" only serve to further expose "the Nixon Administration's deceitful allegations about 'peace' and 'goodwill.'" Populated areas in Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Ha Tay, Nghe An, and Quang Binh provinces were cited as targets for the U.S. attacks, which the statement claimed were "punished" by the downing of six "American marauding planes."

+ The statement of 5 September, "energetically protesting and sternly condemning criminal acts of war" on the 3d and 4th, charged that U.S. aircraft on the 4th rocketed localities in Hanoi and its outskirts and struck areas in the provinces of Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh zone. Also on that day, B-52's allegedly bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone. The only strikes on the 3d mentioned in the protest were attacks by B-52's, "in the middle of a typhoon," on towns and villages in Quang Binh Province.

+ Denouncing "extermination bombings against urban centers and other populated areas," the spokesman's statement of 6 September charged that such attacks are part of a "U.S. scheme to threaten and force the Vietnamese people to accept U.S. arrogant terms." The bombings specifically cited in the statement were the "rocketing and unleashing [of] many bombs of various types" on Haiphong city and its suburbs on the 6th, reportedly the second such bombing in two days, and "intensive bombings" on the 5th of the capital of Ha Tinh Province and of populated areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. In addition, the statement charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships shelled many coastal villages in Nam Ha and Quang Binh provinces.

PLANE DOWNINGS Hanoi's count of alleged U.S. plane downings reached 3,882 as of 6 September, with reported downings over Nghe An, Ninh Binh, Vinh Phu, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, and Ha Tinh provinces, Haiphong, and the Vinh Linh zone. An unspecified number of pilots was reported captured over Haiphong on 6 September. Hanoi claimed that the plane allegedly downed

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over Vinh Linh was a B-52; according to Hanoi's tally, this would be the 11th B-52 downed since the escalation of the air war in April. U.S. officials have never confirmed the loss of a B-52 over the North.

The alleged downing of five F-4 Phantoms over Vinh Phu Province on 2 September was praised by Hanoi radio in a commentary that day. Describing the downing as "an outstanding feat of arms of our people's armed forces greeting the glorious Independence Day of the fatherland," the commentary acclaimed the "rocket troops, air force, and antiaircraft units" for their effective coordination and combat tactics on the occasion. This commentary along with references to attacks on "populous areas" in Vinh Phu, in the 3 September spokesman's protest and the 5 September VNA news item, are Hanoi's only acknowledgement of the U.S. attack on the Phuc Yen airbase in that province, described by U.S. officials as the first attack on the base in four and a half years.

A VNA report of 31 August, reviewing the achievements of the armed forces and people in the North, claimed that they had downed 71 U.S. aircraft between 2 and 28 August and a grand total of 420 war planes--"and many more pilots"--since the escalation of the air war last April. The August figure was revised to 76 in a Hanoi radio commentary of 1 September, which also lauded the militia and self-defense forces for downing 55 planes during the last five months. The Hanoi figures contrast strikingly with official U.S. figures released on 30 August, which list a total of 84 American jets downed and 94 pilots captured since 30 March of this year.

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OLYMPICS TERRORISM

CAUTIOUS SOVIET REACTION CONVEYS DISAPPROVAL OF TERROR TACTICS

Mindful of the dictates of its pro-Arab stance in a critical period of Soviet-Egyptian strains, Moscow has conveyed its disapproval of terror tactics in sparse, cautious reporting on the events set in motion by the Palestinian "Black September" organization's actions against members of the Israeli Olympics team. The Soviet Union is recently on record with a clear condemnation of "mass terror" and "acts of desperation," in the course of an unusually explicit PRAVDA analysis of the Palestinian resistance movement on 29 August.* Its reporting of the Munich developments, however, has been in line with its muted treatment of past such actions by Palestinian fedayeen. Thus Moscow so far has abstained from comment and its news accounts have glossed over much of the detail, in contrast to vocal East European condemnations of the "criminal act" on 5-6 September which resulted in the deaths of 11 Israelis and several Palestinian commandos.

Soviet expressions of regret have been semiofficial, confined to brief statements by sports officials and organizations. TASS on the 6th reported a short statement by the leaders of the Soviet sports delegation in Munich which "deeply deplored the tragedy" but went on in effect to urge continuation of the suspended games, asserting the delegation's desire to promote Olympic ideals and the "successful completion" of the competitions. A second statement, also issued on the 6th, expressed the "profound regret" of the USSR Council of Ministers' committee for physical education and sport, the Soviet Olympics committee, and the Soviet delegation to the Olympic games. This statement merely expressed the belief of Soviet sports organizations and the Soviet public that "terrorist actions are incompatible" with the Olympic movement's spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding.

TASS' first news report cited an Olympics official as explaining at a press conference that members "of the extremist Palestinian organization 'Black September'" had raided the apartment of the Israeli delegation at Olympic Village; "some persons" were killed in the raid, TASS said, adding that the group was holding

* See the 30 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 30-32.

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the other Israelis as hostages while demanding the release of 200 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. The report noted that representatives of the Soviet Olympic delegation had expressed "commiseration" to the Olympic Committee and condolences on the loss of life. Later TASS reports that day tersely referred only to "the situation" and "the incident" in Munich.

Moscow's domestic service on the 6th reported the shootout at Fuerstenfeldbruck military airport outside Munich, where the "terrorists" and their hostages had been transferred from Olympic Village for a flight to "Cairo or Morocco." The account noted the actions of West German police authorities at the airfield and FRG officials' explanations for the "ambush" there. Carefully noncommittal in reporting FRG handling of the situation, Moscow cited West German Government spokesman Ahlers as saying the FRG had no intention of letting the terrorists depart with the hostages and that "the acts on the airfield were planned." A brief TASS report on the 5th mentioned that Chancellor Brandt had issued an appeal to the heads of Arab governments urging them to seek the release of the hostages, but Moscow has been silent on the Arab reactions.

EAST EUROPE: "INSANE ACT" CALLED DISSERVICE TO PALESTINIANS

East European media have condemned the Palestinian commandos for an "insane act" that has rendered "the worst possible service" to the Arab cause. Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia have been outspoken in their condemnations, although Yugoslavia is the only East European government to have issued a formal denunciation of the attack. Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian as well as Yugoslav reports indicated that the respective Olympic delegations had expressed their regret, and the Yugoslavs additionally wired condolences to Israel's Olympic team. The head of the East German Olympic team, interviewed on East Berlin TV on the 5th, said his team was cooperating "with the FRG state organs in matters of this crime" and would express "sympathy to the Israeli Olympic team." Rumania, facing a special dilemma because of its relations with both the Arab states and Israel, has confined itself so far to a statement by its Olympic committee expressing "deep feeling, indignation," and condemnation. There is no available reaction yet from Moscow's most slavish ally, Bulgaria, or from Albania.

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The comments from Moscow's East European partners have reflected the dilemma over where to draw the line between support for the Arab--and Palestinian--"liberation movement" and denunciation of extremist actions. Polish comment has typified the general tenor of these reactions: The party organ TRYBUNA LUDU declared on the 6th that acts of terrorism "cannot be justified by political arguments," and the government organ ZYCIE WARSZAWY observed that the incident did the greatest harm to the Palestinians themselves--a "deeply wronged people" whose fate could not be helped by the murders in Munich. Initial reports from Prague and East Berlin glossed over the identity of the terrorists; but the East Berlin radio did say that GDR "official circles" had condemned the "despicable crime" in the "sharpest possible terms," and Prague radio later decried the "treacherous" assassination by members of the "extremist Palestinian Black September organization." GDR and Czechoslovak media also questioned the effectiveness of FRG security measures in Munich and criticized the West German authorities' handling of the situation at Fuerstenfeldbruck airport.

Warsaw and East Berlin seemed at some pains to portray Arab embarrassment at the Palestinians' acts. The GDR radio stressed the "deep regret" and disapproval of the Arab League's Bonn office. Warsaw radio noted that Egyptian Olympic officials had expressed regret and quoted AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal in Rome as observing that the guerrillas who attacked the Israeli Olympic delegation "lived in the past" and that, unfortunately, people in "a hopeless condition act in a desperate manner." The Polish radio added that even the Palestine Liberation Organization had dissociated itself from the terrorists, and TRYBUNA LUDU also claimed that the act had been condemned by the Arab countries and the main Palestinian organization.

Prague radio felt that rather than bandy about accusations, it would be more appropriate to ask how long the world intends to tolerate a situation in the Middle East which produces such desperate actions, and how long Israel will reject a settlement which would end the Palestinian refugees' humiliation.

Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG found it unacceptable to equate the acts of "a handful of purblind terrorists" with the "just struggle" of several hundred million Arab people. But a Budapest radio commentary on the 6th complained, along the lines of PRAVDA's 29 August criticism, that the Palestinians

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have been incapable of working out a "new and realistic program" within the confines of the possibilities open to them, a situation which left opportunities for the "truly embittered and desperate extremists." In a muted admonition to the Arab governments, Budapest asserted that while the Arab world is obliged to show sympathy toward the Palestinians, "such acts of terror prompt even Arab countries to ponder." They cannot afford, the radio concluded, to let a few fanatics thwart efforts for a settlement.

Belgrade's reaction has been sharper. A statement issued by the federal secretariat for foreign affairs underscored the "great responsibility of the governments of all states" in the world to prevent all forms of terrorism from whatever quarter. The Belgrade POLITIKA in effect advised the Arab states to police the Fedayeen, declaring, according to TANJUG, that "it would be more efficient if every country on whose territory such violence is spreading, infiltrating, and hiding would most resolutely mobilize itself to nip the terrorists in the bud." KOMUNIST was critical of the Palestinian organizations, observing that the least they could do would be to voice their condemnation and dissociate themselves from the "crime." And a Belgrade radio broadcast on the 5th, reported in a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY correspondent's dispatch to his Cairo office, declared that the incidents perpetrated by Palestinian extremists "bring into question the entire organization of the Palestine commandos, as well as Yasir 'Arafat's leadership of it."

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SALT AND DISARMAMENT

MOSCOW ASKS OBSERVANCE OF "LETTER AND SPIRIT" OF AGREEMENTS

Following up on remarks made by CPSU Politburo member Suslov and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov at the 23 August joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet foreign affairs commissions, Soviet commentators have called on the United States to observe "not only the letter but the spirit" of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation accords. Suslov had stated bluntly that the USSR, in "the interests of its security," would "attentively follow the attempts of certain forces in the United States to distort the spirit and letter" of the SALT accords and would take into consideration in its policy "the changes that may appear in the position of the American side"; a 5 September IZVESTIYA article went a step further, in effect questioning whether the United States, by "accelerating" the arms race, was "unilaterally" violating the "common spirit of agreement" and thus endangering the "effectiveness" of the SALT accords themselves.

The meeting at which Suslov spoke and the subsequent comment seemed clearly aimed at placing the Soviet position firmly on record before the Senate reconvened on 5 September to consider the resolution of approval of the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons and the amendments introduced by Senator Jackson. Soviet spokesmen have stressed both the inadmissibility of unilateral U.S. "interpretations" of the Interim Agreement and the need to develop the "seeds of trust" planted at the Moscow summit.

IZVESTIYA ON "DELICATE"
U.S.-USSR RELATIONSHIP

The article in IZVESTIYA on the 5th, by G. Trofimenko, was the third commentary on the Jackson amendments

in that paper in two weeks.* The article included a lengthy denunciation of U.S. "militaristic circles" who are "displeased" with the SALT accords and whose "spokesmen" question their value. Naming Senators Jackson, Goldwater, and Buckley and

* The author, identified in IZVESTIYA only by his academic degree, is presumably Genrykh Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, member of the editorial board of the journal USA: ECONOMY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY; he noted in the IZVESTIYA article that "all aspects" of the SALT accords would be discussed in his article in the September issue of that journal.

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Congressman Ashbrook among the latter, Trofimenko decried their statements that the SALT agreements give the USSR "great unilateral advantages" and "threaten" U.S. security. Labeling as "even more dangerous" for general disarmament the attitude of "the Pentagon and the industrialists connected with it," but without naming Secretary Laird, Trofimenko asserted that although these forces publicly express "readiness to observe the letter" of the accords, they "seem actually to demand 'concessions' from the Administration in the form of permission to accelerate the arms race" in areas not covered by the accords.

Citing the acceleration of the Trident submarine program and construction of the B-1 bomber, Trofimenko charged that the Pentagon was attempting to "force the USSR to take further steps in SALT"--a remark quoted by Trofimenko without attribution. Calling this a reversion to the "position of strength" strategy, the article argued that it "raises doubts" about the principle--accepted by both the United States and the USSR--that "the solution of problems, including those concerning the limitation of strategic arms, should be approached on the basis of equality."

Trofimenko then went on to warn in notably polemical terms against moves that might harm the "delicate" relations between Washington and Moscow:

Whoever thinks seriously and in a businesslike manner of the task of further improving Soviet-U.S. relations and of developing peaceful cooperation between them cannot but be aware that the favorable situation for progress in this direction created since the Moscow agreements is quite delicate and requires careful cultivation of the seeds of trust and mutual understanding sown in Moscow.

It is obvious that without formally violating the letter of the Moscow agreements it is possible, through unilateral actions, to violate the common spirit of agreement so gravely and sharply as to endanger the effectiveness of the agreements themselves. First and foremost, this applies to agreements in a sphere like strategic arms, which is so sensitive and vitally important for both states.

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Trofimenko concluded that the "historical significance" of the SALT accords and the possibility of future agreements "will be mainly determined by the extent to which both sides will observe not only the letter but the spirit of the agreements."

COVERAGE OF SUSLOV,
KUZNETSOV SPEECHES

The proceedings of the 23 August Supreme Soviet session received varied coverage in the Moscow central press. PRAVDA and RED STAR on the 24th published identical TASS-attributed accounts of the meeting, while IZVESTIYA published a much more detailed account by its own special correspondents. The three papers published reports of the Suslov speech which contained no significant variations, but IZVESTIYA's longer account of the session alone included some of the more polemical remarks made by Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff General Kulikov, PRAVDA's senior political commentator Zhukov, and IZVESTIYA's chief editor Tolkunov, among others. PRAVDA has made no direct comment on the controversy over the Jackson amendments, limiting itself to publicizing, for example, statements drawn from the speeches at the foreign affairs commissions' joint meeting.

As reported in the Soviet press, Suslov's speech was sharply critical of attempts to reinterpret the Moscow accords. Alluding to the Jackson amendments, Suslov charged that "representatives" of the U.S. "military-industrial complex" were "trying by all sorts of amendments, stipulations, and recommendations to undermine the principles and pledges on which the agreements between the USSR and the United States--primarily the principle of the two sides' equal security--are based." He labeled as "absurd" the "illusion" that these forces could conduct the forthcoming SALT II negotiations with the USSR "from a position of strength." Moscow radio comment has minced no words in describing Suslov's speech as a "warning" to those U.S. circles opposed to the accords.

In his speech to the Supreme Soviet session Kuznetsov likewise denounced those "figures" in the United States who "are attempting to advance some fabricated additional 'conditions' of the already signed agreements in order to gain unilateral advantages." The deputy foreign minister, speaking "in behalf of the Soviet Government," adamantly declared that "the treaty and the Interim Agreement speak for themselves and do not require interpretation," thereby repudiating any possible interpretation of the Interim Agreement by the Jackson amendments.

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MONITORING BY SATELLITE Moscow media have acknowledged publicly for the second time since the summit that the SALT accords will be monitored by space satellites. Writing in the August issue of the Soviet monthly MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA (WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS), V. Viktorov stated that "the monitoring of the fulfillment of all pledges [made in the SALT accords] is being implemented with the aid of national observation means, including artificial earth satellites." It was the same author, writing in the July issue of the monthly MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, who had disclosed that earth satellites would be used to monitor the accords.*

Soviet media in general have continued to display reticence in acknowledging that the accords will be monitored by satellites. Trofimenko in IZVESTIYA, for example, using terminology from the text of the SALT accords, merely noted that both sides will check "the observance of the obligations assumed by each side" through the use of each side's "national technical means of control."

SOVIET COMMENT ACCUSES WEST OF DELAYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN

In the first Soviet commentary appraising the summer session of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD), Radio Moscow correspondent Vladimir Komlev on 31 August accused the "Western powers" of delaying an agreement on banning chemical weapons by "concentrating the committee's attention on a large number of technical problems"--a tactic that would lead to "endless deliberation" and "would delay for years and years the solving of the most important problem" of formulating a chemical-weapons ban. Komlev's report from Geneva called the draft convention tabled by the communist countries this March the only concrete document submitted to the CCD.

Moscow's coverage at the start of the summer session in June emphasized that a complete ban on chemical weapons had assumed first priority now that the SALT and biological-weapons agreements had been concluded. Commentaries conceded the need for a control mechanism that would "reasonably combine national and international means" and underscored Soviet willingness to consider other "concrete" proposals. But there was no mention of Britain's "two-stage" proposal introduced in early August as a compromise between the Soviet and U.S. positions, and

* See the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, pages 25-26.

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Moscow commentators indicated that U.S. refusal to include in the agreement chemical agents being used in Indochina was at least as great an obstacle as the deadlock over inspection.

As it became apparent that no progress would be made on a CW ban during the summer session, the focus of Moscow's comment on the Geneva conference shifted to proposals for a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and for a world disarmament conference. The replies of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR to the UN Resolution of 16 December 1971 asking for specific proposals from member states by 31 August on the structure and agenda of the world conference were made public in the first week of September. A Soviet response has yet to be publicized.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MAJOR PRAVDA CRITIQUE ASSESSES CHANGES IN CHINESE TACTICS

Moscow has given authoritative expression to its concern over the effects of Peking's policies following this year's summitry and after the Soviets had made a conciliatory gesture to get Sino-Soviet negotiations off dead center. Highlighting Moscow's recently intensified polemical pressure against the Chinese, a comprehensive review of the China question appeared in PRAVDA on 5 September with the authoritative byline of "I. Aleksandrov." An atypically short, narrowly focused Aleksandrov article had appeared in PRAVDA on 16 July during a period of several months of Soviet restraint toward China.* That article, pegged to accounts by Congressmen Boggs and Ford of their talks with Chinese leaders, reflected Moscow's sensitivity toward any tendency in the United States to use China for leverage in the triangular relationship.**

The basic theme underlying the 5 September critique of Peking's policies is that the Chinese have introduced pragmatic tactical adjustments in both domestic and foreign affairs but that the essence of their anti-Soviet strategy is unchanged. This in fact has long been the Soviet line in response to Peking's adoption of more flexible, differentiated policies in recent years, particularly in connection with the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations. What the current upsurge of Soviet efforts to discredit Peking's policies seems to reflect is Soviet disappointment over an apparent failure of Sino-Soviet relations to improve during a period of detente highlighted by the Peking and Moscow summits. In a major policy statement on 20 March between the two summits, Brezhnev had deferred definitive judgment on the results of President Nixon's China visit while calling on the Chinese to respond to Soviet proposals on improving relations and settling the border dispute.

* Lengthy, comprehensive Aleksandrov discourses on the China question such as the 5 September article had previously appeared in PRAVDA on 1 July 1971, marking the CCP's 50th anniversary, and on 16 August 1967 at a time of serious deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

** See the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, pages 28-29.

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He made a concession to the Chinese by agreeing to base Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the basis cited for Sino-U.S. relations at the Peking summit. Brezhnev's speech coincided with the return to the Peking talks of Soviet chief negotiator Ilichev after a three-month absence.

Though Moscow has pointedly raised the border question in its renewed anti-Chinese campaign,* the Aleksandrov article avoided discussing this issue and made no mention of the Peking talks. Aleksandrov chose rather to note "with regret" that the tactical adjustments in Peking's policies have "obviously" been designed to make "the unchanging nationalist course pursued by Peking appear more effective and respectable in the eyes of the Chinese and the progressive world public." That the Soviet bloc is a major if not the primary target of the Aleksandrov article's attempt to counter this tendency is suggested by the emphasis placed at the beginning of the article on the significance of the recent Crimea meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and its allies. Aleksandrov called the meeting a major step forward on the road of consolidating the cohesion of the Soviet bloc--a claim which in this context indicates that Moscow is seeking to coordinate the policies of its allies not only in negotiations with the West but also in checking the inroads of Peking's diplomatic moves.

The Crimea meeting also figured prominently in a recent article by O. Ivanov in the foreign-affairs weekly NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 35) covering much of the same ground as the Aleksandrov article. Ivanov counterposed the Crimea meeting and consolidation of "the socialist community's cohesion" to Peking's divisive moves and anti-Soviet orientation. After reviewing the tactical adjustments

* IZVESTIYA on 8 August seized upon a new Chinese world atlas to complain that Peking has again laid claim to Soviet territory and to warn that such efforts to raise the territorial question represent "a dangerous trend fraught with serious consequences." Reflecting a less than sanguine appraisal of Sino-Soviet border negotiations, the article suggested that publication of the atlas meant that the Chinese sought to raise the territorial question in order to complicate Sino-Soviet relations "for many years to come." Though IZVESTIYA did not mention the Peking talks, another article discussing the atlas, in NOVOYE VREMYA No. 33, pointedly asked why territorial claims are being made at a time when border negotiations are taking place.

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being undertaken by Peking on a variety of issues, Ivanov concluded that concerted action by the communist parties and countries make it possible to weaken and divert the impact of Peking's moves.

Concerted action by Moscow's allies has been evidenced in their treatment of the Aleksandrov article, which on the day after its publication was carried in some form in the press of each of Moscow's East European allies except maverick Romania. That Peking's success in wooing the Romanians is one of Moscow's concerns was reflected in Aleksandrov's observation that the Chinese seek to play on nationalist sentiments and to promote a neutralist position on the Sino-Soviet conflict among communist parties.

LIN PIAO AFFAIR Both the Aleksandrov article and the similar Ivanov article in NOVOYE VREMYA mentioned recent Western press reports--"obviously instigated by Peking"--recounting the Lin Piao affair. Treading gingerly on delicate ground, Aleksandrov explained that the purpose of the account being disseminated was to absolve Mao of responsibility for the purge "and possibly physical annihilation" of a group of leading officials. Giving no details of the reports, which said Lin was killed while trying to flee to the Soviet Union after plotting against Mao, Aleksandrov noted vaguely that "the Maoists" seek to attribute the affair to "'intrigues' by the Soviet Union" and that they need to resort to "ever more absurd fabrications" to foster anti-Soviet feelings among a populace fed up with anti-Soviet propaganda. Soviet broadcasts of the article to Chinese listeners have included these allusions to charges of Soviet involvement in the Lin affair.

The Aleksandrov article carefully avoided discussing what issues may have precipitated the Lin affair, but Ivanov ventured to suggest that there was a conflict over the "reorientation" of Peking's foreign policy toward the United States. Though Moscow has shied away from using an authoritative vehicle like an I. Aleksandrov PRAVDA article to approach such a sensitive issue, the view that Peking's moves to improve relations with the United States while remaining hostile to the Soviet Union has been a factor in the Chinese leadership crisis has been given some currency in Soviet commentary. Most notably, an article by M. I. Dalnev in the second issue (signed to press 25 May) of the new Soviet academic journal PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST argued that the upper hand in Peking has been gained by "the Mao Tse-tung/Chou En-lai group," which occupies positions of "a great-power

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outlook and violent anti-Sovietism and pursues a policy of rapprochement with the capitalist world." The article suggested, rather tentatively, that the current Peking leadership's policy of accommodation with the West--at one point the article mentioned the President's visit to China--apparently encountered resistance "in the leading circles of the army."

Dalnev's reference to a Mao-Chou "group" reflects Moscow's disillusionment over Chou and its recognition that the Chinese premier has been a principal architect of the policies arousing the concern expressed in the Aleksandrov article. A major Soviet policy statement on China nearly six years ago (PRAVDA's editorial article of 27 November 1966) had introduced the formula "Mao Tse-tung and his group," an anathema formula signaling to the communist movement that the Maoist leadership no longer enjoyed a legitimate standing in the communist ranks. Previously Moscow had scrupulously referred to "Comrade Mao" even in polemical statements. During the course of the cultural revolution, when Mao and his associates were subjected to withering abuse by the Soviets, Chou was largely spared the same sort of vituperative treatment. Significantly, Brezhnev's 27 October 1969 speech welcoming the opening of Sino-Soviet border negotiations the previous week included the notably conciliatory gesture of referring to "Comrade Chou." Moscow's pairing of Chou with Mao in the anathema formula--though not yet in a major policy statement--now registers its reappraisal of Chou's role in the light of recent developments in big-power relations.

PRC RELATIONS WITH WEST, USSR The 5 September Aleksandrov article returned to the subject of the 16 July one by citing the Boggs and Ford accounts of their talks with the Chinese to charge that Chou called on the United States to maintain a large-scale nuclear program in competition with the Soviets. Aleksandrov professed difficulty in finding anything to compare with "such a gross betrayal of the cause of socialism." In another reference to nuclear matters, the article said the Chinese have made no secret of their desire to draw on the scientific and technological resources of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe to accelerate their military-industrial development, including their nuclear-missile potential. However, the article made no effort to portray a threat to Soviet security or to warn against such a development.

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Picking up a theme broached in a 13 August IZVESTIYA article, Aleksandrov claimed that Peking is wooing "reactionary anti-Soviet circles in Europe" in the interests of frustrating European detente and the proposed European security conference. Aleksandrov delicately noted that the Chinese say a European security system "would be utilized to China's detriment"--an oblique reference to Chinese fears that detente in Europe would strengthen Moscow's hand to apply pressure on the Chinese.

Among other Soviet concerns expressed in the article, Aleksandrov complained that the "powerful propaganda machine of imperialism" has begun treating Maoist China in an approving light. Citing the United States as a striking example, Aleksandrov lamented that "now even influential U.S. imperialist circles are at times among the popularizers of Maoism."

The article concluded by invoking the standard line on Sino-Soviet relations propounded at the 24th CPSU Congress, declaring that Moscow will resist any encroachment on its national interests while expressing readiness to normalize relations with the PRC. The Ivanov NOVOYE VREMYA article also cited the congress line but went on to recall Brezhnev's 20 March speech, including its references to standing Soviet proposals concerning nonaggression, settlement of border questions, and improved relations. Brezhnev having left the negotiating ball in the Chinese court, the Ivanov article nearly a half-year later concluded by quoting him as saying the next move is up to the Chinese.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

BREZHNEV TOURS PROVINCES IN SEARCH OF GRAIN AND COTTON

Brezhnev returned to Moscow on 5 September following a 13-day tour of Central Asia, and Western Siberia ostensibly aimed at promoting the grain and cotton harvests in those areas. During the tour Brezhnev visited seven provincial centers, where he reportedly was "warmly greeted" on each stopover and addressed gatherings of local party and government leaders. Although Brezhnev's speeches were not reported by the media, they apparently dealt mainly with agricultural matters. During his stopover in Novosibirsk on 1 September, however, he reportedly also discussed "some questions of international policy." His agenda presumably also included military matters, in view of the fact that on three occasions during his tour--in Krasnoyarsk on 28 August, in Novosibirsk on 30 August, and in Omsk on 1 September--he was met at the airport by Col. Gen. M. G. Khomulo, commander of the Siberian Military District, as well as by local party and government leaders.

Brezhnev's Itinerary

24-25 Aug.	Visited Kokchetav, Kazakhstan, and addressed a conference of party, government and agricultural leaders.
26-27 Aug.	Visited Barnaul, Altay kray, and addressed an expanded plenum of the Altay kraykom.
28-29 Aug.	Visited Krasnoyarsk and addressed a conference of the party and economic aktiv.
30 Aug.-1 Sept.	Visited Novosibirsk and addressed a meeting of the party and economic aktiv.
1-2 Sept.	Visited Omsk and addressed a meeting of the party and economic aktiv.
2-3 Sept.	Visited Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, and discussed domestic economic matters with members of the Kazakh Central Committee leadership.
4-5 Sept.	Visited Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and addressed a conference of the party and economic aktiv of five cotton growing republics--Azerbaijan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

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CHINA

CHIANG CHING IN LOWER POSITION AT HO HSIANG-NING FUNERAL

PRC leaders attending the funeral of Ho Hsiang-ning on 5 September were listed in state rank, following the pattern set on Army Day, with PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Vice Chairman Soong Ching-ling ranked above other leaders including Chou En-lai. However, in a major departure from previous rankings, Chiang Ching was named after Liu Po-cheng in the list of those who sent wreaths to the memorial service. Since the purge of Huang Yung-shen, Chiang had been listed before other members of the Politburo, following the members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Liu seldom appears, but has been listed previously among the middle ranks of the Politburo. In the January report of hospital visitors to Chen I before his death, Liu was ranked after Chang Chun-chiao; for the Hsieh Fu-chih funeral in March he was listed ahead of other Politburo members who sent wreaths, but none of the more senior members were on this list. At Ho's funeral Liu was not named as holding any new state office which might give him priority over Chiang and, considering that he is eighty years old and that his infrequent public appearances are thought to be due to poor health, it seems unlikely that he has been named to one of the PRC's vacant military posts. The political resurrection of Yeh Chien-ying and Chu Te, however, makes this a possibility that cannot be completely ruled out. Liu's higher rank could also reflect a rise in the status of members of Liu's old second field army in the wake of the Lin purge.

All members of the Politburo in good standing were either listed as having attended the ceremony or as having sent a wreath. Many of the active secondary leaders also appeared, including such recently rehabilitated figures as Wu Leng-hsi. Curiously absent from the ceremony was Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who on that same afternoon also failed to attend the departure of the Japanese advance party preparing the Tanaka visit, which Chi had greeted on its arrival on 2 September.

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